Deprivation of trade marks through state interference in their usage by Dean, Owen H.
1DEPRIVATION OF TRADE MARKS 
THROUGH STATE INTERFERENCE 
IN THEIR USAGE
Prof Owen H Dean
May 2013
2DEPRIVATION OF TRADE MARKS THROUGH STATE INTERFERENCE IN THEIR USAGE
Inaugural lecture delivered on 21 May 2013
Prof Owen H Dean
Chair of Intellectual Property Law
Department of  Mercantile Law
Faculty of Law
Stellenbosch University
Editor: SU Language Centre
Printing: SUN MeDIA
ISBN:  978-0-7972-1446-0
Copyright © 2013 Owen H Dean
1ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Owen Dean holds the 
degrees BA (Law), LLB and 
LLD from Stellenbosch 
University, obtained in, 
respectively, 1964, 1966 
and 1989. He is admitted 
to practice as an attorney in 
South Africa, Namibia and 
Botswana. 
Dean is a previous Chairman, 
presently a consultant, of Spoor and Fisher, leading 
intellectual property attorneys. His personal fields of 
specialisation include trade mark and copyright law, with 
a special emphasis on litigation and opinion work. He 
served on the Government’s Advisory Committee on 
Intellectual Property Law for 20 years and as Chairman 
of the Copyright Subcommittee of that committee. He 
is also a former President of the South African Institute 
of Intellectual Property Law. He conceived and chaired 
the Drafting Committee of the Counterfeit Goods Act 
and also conceived and drafted section 15A of the 
Merchandise Marks Act (ambush marketing).
Dean is the author of the Handbook of South African 
Copyright Law; the author of the chapter on “South 
Africa” in International Privacy, Publicity and Personality 
Laws, edited by Michael Henry; the author of the chapter 
on “South Africa” in Copyright: World Law and Practice, 
edited by Morag McDonald, Uma Suthersanen and 
Cristina Garrigues; and co-author of the title “Copyright” 
in Butterworths Forms and Precedents.
Dean has served as a member of the international 
editorial boards of Copyright World and Entertainment Law 
Review. He has published articles in, inter alia, the following 
journals: Trademark World, Copyright World, Managing 
Intellectual Property, European Intellectual Property Review 
(EIPR), Entertainment Law Review, Canadian Intellectual 
Property Review, De Rebus, Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse 
Romeins-Hollandse Reg/Journal of Contemporary Roman-
Dutch Law, South African Law Journal, Businessman’s Law, 
Stellenbosch Law Review, SA Mercantile Law Journal, Juta’s 
Business Law, Responsa Meridiana and Encyclopaedia of 
Brands and Branding.
Dean is a frequent speaker on intellectual property 
matters at seminars and conferences, including 
international meetings organised by the International 
Trademarks Association (INTA), the Institute of 
Trademark Agencies (ITMA) the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO) and the International 
Association of Entertainment Lawyers (IAEL). He has 
lectured on intellectual property law at the University 
of the Witwatersrand, the University of Cape Town, 
Rhodes University, Stellenbosch University and the Rand 
Afrikaans University (now University of Johannesburg).
Dean has been appointed to the Panel of Adjudicators 
for South African Domain Name Disputes, the World 
Intellectual Property Organization Panel of Arbitrators 
for Domain Name Disputes, the Stellenbosch University 
Business School Panel of Mediators and the Intellectual 
Property Panel of the Arbitration Federation of South 
Africa (AFSA).
He was listed as a Senior Statesman of Intellectual 
Property and a Key Individual of Spoor and Fisher by 
Chambers and Partners in 2012 and 2013 in the Global-
Wide and Pan-Regional sections of the Chambers Global 
rankings.
With effect from 2011, he was appointed as a professor 
at the Faculty of Law at Stellenbosch University, where 
he is the incumbent of the Anton Mostert Chair of 
Intellectual Property Law.
2
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THROUGH STATE INTERFERENCE IN 
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1. INTRODUCTION
A global war is being waged against the use of tobacco products, in particular the smoking of cigarettes. 
The formal declaration of war was issued by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) in the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (the Convention),1 
proclaimed in Geneva on 21 May 2003. According to 
the WHO, the Convention was developed in response 
to the globalisation of the ‘tobacco epidemic’, which 
has been facilitated, inter alia, through global marketing, 
transnational tobacco advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship, and international movement of counterfeit 
goods. The 169 signatory countries undertook to strive 
in good faith to ratify, accept or approve the Convention 
and show political commitment not to undermine its 
objectives.2  
The focus of the Convention is far removed from trade 
marks as such. In Article 11 of the Convention, member 
countries are required to adopt effective measures 
to ensure that tobacco packaging and labelling do not 
promote a tobacco product by any means that are false, 
misleading, deceptive or likely to create an erroneous 
impression about its characteristics, health effects, hazards 
or emissions. Furthermore, any outside packaging and 
labelling should carry health warnings that should cover 
50% or more of the principal display areas.3 
The Convention makes provision for Guidelines to be 
issued. In terms of these guidelines:
“Parties should consider adopting measures to restrict or 
prohibit the use of logos, colours, brand images or
promotional information on packaging other than brand
names and product names displayed in the standard colour
and font style (plain packaging).”4  
It must be emphasised that this stipulation is not 
peremptory and that it is open to member countries 
to implement it or not. As will be discussed below, it is 
contended that this particular guideline has given rise to 
the conception of a faulty premise.
The guideline is motivated by the notion that:
“This [plain packaging] may increase the noticeability and
effectiveness of health warnings and messages, [to] prevent 
the packaging from detracting attention from them, and [to] 
address package design techniques that may suggest that
some products are less harmful than others.”5  
This motivation has contributed to the formation of the 
faulty premise.
Many countries, including Australia and South Africa, have 
given effect to the obligation prescribed in Article 11 of 
the Convention by passing legislation that curtails the 
advertising and promotion of tobacco products.
A new front in the war on tobacco products has, 
however, now emerged. There is an international 
move to give effect to the abovementioned (voluntary) 
guideline by adopting legislation restricting or prohibiting 
the use of logos and the like on the packaging of tobacco 
products. The intention is to allow only brand names 
or product names, depicted in a plain manner, to be 
displayed on the packaging of tobacco products.
Australia is at the forefront of this new offensive. It has 
adopted the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act, 2011. The 
Australian attack will doubtless set an international trend. 
Other countries, including New Zealand and Namibia, 
are already working on legislation to restrict the use of 
trade marks on the packaging of tobacco products. It is 
likely that countries such as those of the European Union 
and the United Kingdom will follow suit. 
42.  AUSTRALIAN PLAIN    
 PACKAGING LEGISLATION
The Australian Tobacco Plain Packaging Act, 2011 (the 
TPP Act) imposes significant restrictions on the colour, 
shape and finish of retail packaging for tobacco products. 
It prohibits the use of trade marks on such packaging, 
other than in a manner specifically permitted. It allows 
only the use of a brand name or a business or company 
name for the relevant tobacco product.6  
The stated objectives of the TPP Act include the 
improvement of public health by discouraging people 
from taking up smoking, encouraging people to give up 
smoking, discouraging people from relapsing if they have 
given it up and reducing people’s exposure to smoke 
from tobacco products.7  
The Tobacco Plain Packaging Regulations, 2011, made 
under the TPP Act, proscribe embellishments on 
cigarette packs and cartons. Packaging is allowed to be 
rectangular and to have only a matt finish, and the surface 
must be the colour prescribed by the Regulations, in 
other words, a drab dark brown. The use of trade marks 
on retail packaging of tobacco products is prohibited, 
other than as permitted by section 20(3)(a) of the TPP 
Act. It provides that the owners of tobacco trade marks 
can no longer use them or any part of them on cigarette 
packaging, save when a “brand, business or company 
name […] is a ‘word’ mark or part of a mark”.8  
In other words, the legislation provides that trade marks 
can only be used in a bland, word mark form and that, 
in particular, no logos, device marks or label marks may 
be featured on the packaging of tobacco products. This 
amounts to an outright prohibition of the use of any 
trade mark that is not a plain word mark, in other words, 
logos and the like. Such marks are, of course, trade marks 
in their own right and are registerable and protectable as 
such. The use of independently registered trade marks is 
thus being prevented.
3.  AUSTRALIAN LITIGATION
International tobacco companies went on the counter-
offensive against the TPP Act. In 2011 JT International 
SA and British American Tobacco Australasia Services 
Limited and others9  instituted court proceedings against 
the Commonwealth of Australia, contending that the 
TPP Act was contrary to the Australian Constitution. 
In the litigation the plaintiffs sought a declaration that 
the TPP Act did not apply and had no operation in its 
application to the trade marks and the get-up used on 
tobacco products by the plaintiffs. In the alternative, they 
sought a declaration that the TPP Act was invalid in its 
application to trade marks and get-up.10  
Section 51 (3xxxi) of the Australian Constitution confers 
upon the Commonwealth Parliament the power to 
make laws with respect to “[t]he acquisition of property 
on just terms from any state or person for any purpose in 
respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws”. 
The plaintiffs argued that trade marks were “property” for 
the purposes of this provision and that by enacting the 
TPP Act, together with the Regulations, the state had 
“acquired” property belonging to the plaintiffs on terms 
that were not just. 
The litigation raised two principal issues: firstly, whether 
trade marks and other intellectual property rights were 
“property” and, secondly, whether the limitation on the 
use of the trade marks amounted to “the acquisition of 
property”. The court found that while trade marks and 
other forms of intellectual property were property for 
purposes of the constitutional provision, the prevention 
of the use of trade marks did not amount to the 
acquisition of those trade marks by the state. The 
court conceded that the trade marks had effectively been 
extinguished, but it held that extinguishing trade marks 
did not amount to their acquisition by the state. 
In his judgment, French, CJ opined that:
“While the imposition of those controls may be said to
constitute a taking in a sense that the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of
their intellectual property rights and related rights is restricted,
the corresponding imposition of controls on the packaging
and presentation of tobacco products does not involve 
the accrual of the benefit of a proprietary character to the 
Commonwealth which would constitute an acquisition.”11 
In other words, the court held that while there had 
been a deprivation of property in the form of trade 
marks (because the trade marks had effectively been 
extinguished), the state had not in the process actually 
acquired the ownership of the trade marks, as required 
by the Australian Constitution in order to render the 
relevant provision of the law invalid. 
54.  REACTION TO THE    
 AUSTRALIAN DECISION
The Australian judgement has been hailed as a triumphant 
victory in a major battle in the global war against the 
use of tobacco products. The notion has been fostered 
that if plain packaging legislation cannot successfully be 
challenged on a constitutional basis in Australia, it cannot 
be constitutionally challenged successfully throughout the 
rest of the world. The South African Government appears 
to hold this view. IOL Business was quoted as saying on 
16 August 2012 that “South Africa will follow Australia’s 
example by trying to ban the display of brand names on 
tobacco products”. Health Minister Aaron Motsoaledi 
was quoted by The Times newspaper as saying (with 
reference to plain package legislation in South Africa) that 
“we will do it, definitely […] rest assured, I’m extremely 
excited”. 
Minister Motsoaledi had said previously that if the 
Australian Government won the case, South Africa would 
follow suit with similar legislation. TimesLIVE reported on 
16 August 2012 that Minister Motsoaledi had told the 
Australian Health Minister that “if you win, you will win 
for all of us” and that he had later said that “she has won 
for all of us”.
The minister’s views are clearly based on the assumption 
that if plain packaging legislation does not offend against 
the Australian Constitution, it follows that it will also 
not offend against the South African Constitution. 
The purpose of this study is to test the validity of this 
assumption. It will be submitted that the assumption is 
indeed incorrect and that there are significant differences 
between the provisions of the South African Constitution 
as compared to those of the Australian Constitution that 
render such an assumption invalid. The outcome of the 
Australian case thus has little importance in South Africa 
and it has little or no precedental value for South African 
law. What is, however, significant about the court’s 
decision is that it found that trade marks and other 
forms of intellectual property constituted ‘property’ for 
constitutional purposes and that prohibiting the use of a 
trade mark had the effect of extinguishing that trade mark, 
thereby bringing about the destruction or obliteration of 
an item of property.
It is likely that similar considerations will apply to other 
countries and that the Australian decision will also have 
little precedental value in countries where constitutional 
provisions dealing with deprivation of property are 
different from those of the Australian Constitution. The 
Australian decision turns substantially on the particular 
wording of the relevant provision of the Australian 
Constitution.
5.  THE SOUTH AFRICAN    
 CONSTITUTION 
Section 25 of the South African Constitution deals with 
property. For present purposes, the relevant part of the 
section reads as follows:
(1)  No one may be deprived of property except in  
         terms of a law of general application, and no law 
      may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
(2)  Property may be expropriated in terms of law of 
      general application – 
(a)  for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b)  subject   to   compensation,  the  amount  of  
 which  and  the time  and manner  of   payment   of 
 which have either been agreed to by those affected 
 or decided or approved by the court. 
(3)  ………………. 
(4)  For the purposes of this section – 
(a)   the public interest includes the nation’s   
 commitment to land reform, and to reforms to  
 bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s
 natural resources; and 
(b)  property is not limited to land.
Section 36(1) of the South African Constitution also has 
relevance to the present study. It contains the following 
proviso: 
(1)  The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in 
 terms of law of general application to the extent that 
 the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open
 and democratic society based on human dignity, 
 equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant  
 factors including 
(a) the nature of the rights;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its 
       purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
Section 25(1) deals with deprivation of property, 
while sections 25(2) and (3) deal with expropriation 
of property. Read with section 25(4), the thrust of the 
section is to protect existing property interests against 
unconstitutional interference.12 Although section 25(4)
(b) makes it clear that the section does not only deal 
with immovable property, it is apparent from paragraph 
(a) of the subsection that the main focus of the section 
is indeed immovable property and more particularly 
land reform. The impression is gained that the provision 
6stating that property is not limited to land is something of 
a catch-all afterthought. It is submitted that this factor can 
lead to somewhat strained interpretations of the section 
when applying it to other forms of property besides land. 
This is particularly true when applying the section to 
intellectual property. 
In First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister 
of Finance (FNB case),13 the court held in effect that 
deprivation of the property (section 25[1]) is a genus 
of which expropriation (section 25[2]) is a species. Put 
differently, ‘expropriation’ is a subset of ‘deprivation’. In 
other words, in considering whether a particular taking 
of property is an expropriation, the court must first apply 
the test laid down in section 25(1) for a deprivation 
of property.14 Expropriation of property can only 
conceivably take place in instances where there has been 
a deprivation of property. 
The methodology for determining a constitutional 
property dispute set forth in the FNB case is summarised 
by Du Bois in the following terms:
•	 It	 must	 be	 determined	 whether	 the	 property
 interest in question qualifies as property for
 constitutional purposes. 
•	 It	must	next	be	determined	whether	there	was
 a deprivation of property.
•	 If	there	has	been	a	deprivation	of	property,	was
 it arbitrary and therefore in conflict with
 section 25(1)?
•	 If	there	was	an	arbitrary	deprivation,	the	second
 step is to determine whether section 36(1) may
 justify such a deprivation. If not, the enquiry
 ends here, since the limitation is unconstitutional. 
•	 In	the	event	that	the	deprivation	conflicts	with
 section 25(1) (it is arbitrary) but may be justified
 under section 36(1), or in the event that it is not
 arbitrary (and therefore does not offend against 
 section 25(1)), it must be determined whether
 the deprivation is also an expropriation. 
•	 If	 it	 does	 amount	 to	 an	 expropriation,	 the
 deprivation must be tested against the  
 requirements set out in sections 25(2) and (3).
 Should these requirements be met, the  
 expropriation is constitutional and the enquiry 
 ends there. 
•	 However,	if	the	requirements	of	sections		
 25(2) and (3) are not met (and the expropriation 
 in principle demands payment of compensation), 
 the expropriation could still in principle be
 justified under section 36(1). If it may be 
 justified, the expropriation is constitutional, but 
 if section 36(1) cannot justify it, the expropriation 
 is unconstitutional and invalid.15  
It is necessary to examine the meaning of certain of the 
terms contained in section 25 and more particularly 
‘property’, ‘deprivation’, ‘arbitrary’, ‘expropriation’ and 
‘law of general application’. 
5.1 What constitutes property? 
Section 25 of the Constitution does not contain a 
definition of property. It simply specifies that for purposes 
of constitutional protection, “property is not limited to 
land”.16  Van der Walt interprets this to mean “that 
movable corporeal property as well as intangibles such 
as commercial interest and intellectual property [are] 
included under the protection on section 25 as a motive 
cause.”17  
5.2 What does deprivation entail?
The deprivation contemplated in section 25(1) was 
given a general description by the Constitutional Court 
in the FNB case.18 This is summed up by Mostert and 
Badenhorst as being “basically any interference with 
the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property 
involves some kind of deprivation relating to the 
entitlement to the property concerned.”19 
Mostert and Badenhorst go on to say:
“The court then furnished the example of dispossession of 
an owner of “all rights, use and benefit to and of corporeal 
movable goods”, but it also anticipated the possibility of 
infringement upon only some of the ownership 
entitlements.”20  
It is accepted that for the purposes of deprivation, 
property has various separate incidents and that reliance 
can be placed on constitutional protection for some and 
not necessarily all of the incidents of ownership.21 For 
instance, the use of property is in itself an incident that 
can be constitutionally protected, and interference with it 
could amount to deprivation.
Depriving the owner of property of the use of that 
property thus constitutes deprivation for the purposes of 
section 25. Deprivation naturally also encompasses the 
total destruction of property, which would remove from 
the owner all the incidents of ownership of that property. 
75.3 Deprivation that is arbitrary
Mostert and Badenhorst summarise the test for 
arbitrariness laid down in the FNB case as follows:
“[A] deprivation of property is “arbitrary” for purposes of 
section 25 when the “law” referred to in section 25(1) does 
not provide sufficient reason for the particular deprivation 
in question or is procedurally unfair.”22 
The learned authors further describe the principle in the 
following manner:
“[T]he law effecting deprivation should not only illustrate 
a rational connection between a legitimate governmental 
purpose in the manner in which it should be achieved, but it 
should illustrate adequate cause for a deprivation.”23
In other words, it is necessary for the law to strike a 
proportionate balance between the public purpose that 
it serves and the private property of which it deprives 
the owner.24  The deprivation of the property must 
provide an effective means for achieving the end that is 
the objective of the law. If the deprivation is not likely to 
cause that end to be achieved, it will be arbitrary. 
According to the methodology to be used when 
interpreting section 25 as set forth in the FNB case, 
when it has been found that an arbitrary deprivation of 
property has taken place, it is necessary to determine 
whether the proportionality test provided for in section 
36 can justify the deprivation. The question arises 
whether the proportionality test adds anything to the 
debate regarding arbitrariness in section 25(1). The view 
has been expressed that the criteria justifying a limitation 
of rights in section 36(1) have in effect been included in 
the demarcation of rights in section 25(1) itself.25  
According to Mostert and Badenhorst, “proportionality 
refers to the justifiability and rationality of a particular 
imposition on property”.26  It is submitted that in regard 
to property rights (as distinct from other types of rights 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights), the arbitrariness test 
in section 25 and the proportionality test in section 
36 amount to the same thing. It is difficult to conceive 
how a deprivation that does not provide an effective 
means for achieving the objective of the legislation (and 
is therefore arbitrary) can be justified or rational (and 
be proportional). Accordingly, once it is found that a 
deprivation is arbitrary, it will follow as a matter of course 
that it is not proportional and that it cannot therefore be 
excused or justified in terms of section 36.
5.4  When is a deprivation an expropriation?
For the purposes of section 25 it is necessary to 
distinguish between the concepts of ‘expropriation’ and 
‘deprivation’. As previously stated, the former is seen to 
be a species of the genus constituted by the latter. This 
means that a particular infringement on the property 
right must in the first place constitute a deprivation and 
then, depending on its further characteristics, it may also 
constitute an expropriation. In terms of this approach, 
it is generally accepted that an expropriation and a 
deprivation are indeed conceptually continuous notions.27 
There is a spectrum commencing with deprivation at the 
one extremity and culminating with expropriation at the 
other extremity. At some point on the axis, deprivation 
metamorphoses into expropriation.
One of the most important criteria for determining when 
the metamorphosis takes place is the inferred requirement 
that expropriation necessarily entails the acquisition of 
the property by the state. In this regard, Mostert and 
Badenhorst state that under the common law, compulsory 
acquisition of property by a public authority for a public 
purpose is a prerequisite for expropriation. Opinions vary 
considerably as to whether this common law principle 
has survived the new constitutional dispensation, 
especially because no explicit mention is made of it in 
the constitutional provisions dealing with expropriation. 
In this regard, the Constitutional Court in the FNB case 
warned against referring to pre-constitutional judgements 
on expropriation when interpreting section 25 of the 
Constitution. It cautioned that circumspection was 
necessary because such judgements were not necessarily 
reliable when it came to interpreting the property clauses 
under the Interim Constitution and the 1996 Constitution. 
Uncertainty about the applicability of the appropriation 
requirement may render it difficult to decide whether 
a particular situation amounts to expropriation or not, 
especially when property is not taken by the state but is 
rather regulated to such an extent that basically nothing 
remains of the ownership entitlement.28  
Mostert has expressed the view that the notion that 
for expropriation to take place, it is a prerequisite that 
deprivation should be accompanied by an acquisition 
of the benefits by the state seems erroneous in the 
constitutional context.29  This view of the matter is borne 
out by the following dictionary meanings of the word 
‘expropriate’:
8“Disposses (a person) of ownership; deprive of 
property”: The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.
“Take away property from its owner”: The Concise 
Oxford English Dictionary.
“To deprive of possession or property right”: 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary.
“To deprive of possession”: TheFreeDictionary by 
Farlex. This dictionary gives the derivation of the word 
as being “from Medieval Latin expropriare to deprive of 
possession, from proprius own”.
The Australian Constitutional provision refers to 
‘acquisition’ of property in this context, as do several 
others, and it can be argued that this is the term that the 
legislature ought to have used in the event that acquisition 
of the property in question by the state was intended to 
be a necessary element of the expropriation process. 
Kleyn holds the view that expropriation in the 
constitutional sense can also entail severe infringement of 
property without actual acquisition by the state, despite 
the common law requirement that there should be a 
passing of ownership to the state.30  
The authorities deal with the concept of ‘constructive 
expropriation’. Mostert describes this concept as follows: 
“A legislative or administrative measure, which has the effect 
of removing and destroying all the rights of the particular 
property holder (whether or not a corresponding advantage 
is granted to the expropriator or another party) without 
envisaging the payment of compensation, can generally be 
described as constructive expropriation. The intended 
effect of a specific imposition on an owner or property 
right holder should therefore be the main consideration; 
even if nothing in the particular legislative or administrative 
measure is meant to be an expropriation (or even obviously 
resembles an expropriation), the effect of the measure may 
still factually result in expropriation.”31 
In Steinberg v South Peninsula Municipality,32 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal said that there may be room for 
the development of the doctrine of constructive 
expropriation in South Africa in cases where a public 
body utilised its power to regulate private property 
excessively, but it left the question open. This issue was 
also raised and left open by the Constitutional Court in 
Reflect-All 1025 CC and others v MEC for Public Transport, 
Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government and 
another.33  The Supreme Court of Appeal likewise again 
left the question open in Minister of Minerals and Energy v 
Agri South Africa and another.34  
Mostert says;
“The future of the doctrine of constructive expropriation in 
South Africa has still not been determined. […] The recent 
decision of Ackerman J in FNB v SARS does, however, 
provide some pointers towards the continued relevance of 
constructive expropriation in our law.”35  
For reasons that will be advanced below, it is submitted 
that there is room and justification for the incorporation 
of the doctrine of constructive expropriation in South 
African law, especially in connection with the deprivation 
of property in the form of trade marks.
In the premises, it is eminently arguable that a deprivation 
of property that is so far-reaching or extreme as to 
effectively nullify or destroy all the attributes of property 
without actually passing ownership of a property to the 
state can constitute at least constructive expropriation, 
if not expropriation per se, for the purposes of section 
25(2) of the Constitution.
5.5 Law of general application
For a legitimate deprivation to take place, it must be 
brought about in terms of a law of general application. 
This concept includes statutes, subordinate legislation as 
well as criminal law and customary law.36 Mostert and 
Badenhorst say that the relevant law must apply generally 
and not solely to an individual case.37 
“Most laws affect classes or groups of people, rather than 
all members of society. This does not mean that the laws 
will not pass the requirement of “general applicability”. 
Instead, a law will not comply with this requirement if it 
singles out a particular (group of) person(s) for 
discriminatory treatment.”38 
This raises the question of whether a law that deals only 
with the rights of the owners of tobacco trade marks and 
not trade mark owners in general passes the test.
 
5.6 Conclusion
It will be contended below that South African legislation 
that prevents or prohibits the use of trade marks on 
tobacco products infringes both sections 25(1) and (2) 
of the Constitution in that such legislation will bring 
about an arbitrary deprivation of property, and indeed an 
expropriation of such property, at least as a manifestation 
of constructive expropriation.
96. ESSENTIAL NATURE AND   
 CHARACTER OF TRADE MARKS
As a precursor to discussing the relationship between 
the prohibition of the use of trade marks and the 
deprivation of property as contemplated in section 25 
of the Constitution, it is first necessary to examine the 
essential nature and character of a trade mark in South 
African law.
The Trade Marks Act, 1993 (the Trade Marks Act) 
defines the term ‘mark’ as;
“any sign capable of being represented graphically, including 
a device, name, signature, word, letter, numeral, shape, 
configuration, pattern, or ornamentation, colour or container 
for goods or any combination of the aforementioned.”39 
The term ‘trade mark’ is defined as follows:
“other than a certification trade mark or a collective trade 
mark, means a mark used or proposed to be used by a 
person in relation to goods or services for the purpose of 
distinguishing the goods or services in relation to which the 
mark is used or proposed to be used from the same kind of 
goods or services connected in the course of trade with any 
other person.”40 
A trade mark is thus a sign that designates the goods of 
a particular trader, and it enables the public to distinguish 
that trader’s goods from competing or corresponding 
goods produced by other traders. It is, as the courts have 
termed it, a ‘badge of origin’.41 In order to perform the 
function of a trade mark, a mark must be distinctive of 
the goods of its proprietor.42 In general, a mark that is 
descriptive of the goods to which it is applied or of any 
characteristic of them is not distinctive and is thus not 
capable of being a trade mark for the purposes of the 
Trade Marks Act.
In essence, a trade mark is a symbol that delivers the 
message and signifies in respect of the goods or services 
to which it is applied that ‘this is the product of trader X’. 
This is what is meant by a trade mark being a ‘badge of 
origin’.
6.1 Different types of trade mark
Trade mark law contemplates three separate guises for 
trade marks or three different forms of trade mark. First, 
there is a registered trade mark in terms of the Trade 
Marks Act; second, there is a so-called ‘well-known 
foreign mark’ under the Paris Convention, which enjoys 
statutory protection in terms of the Trade Marks Act; and 
third, there is a mark that by virtue of extensive use that 
has caused it to acquire a distinctive character is under the 
common law able to found a claim of passing off against 
someone who uses a confusingly similar mark. The latter 
form of mark is in practice known as a ‘common law 
mark’.
A particular mark can enjoy concurrent protection in 
more than one of these guises. For instance, a trade mark 
of foreign origin that has been used to a significant extent 
and enjoys a repute in South Africa as an indication of 
origin can be registered under the Trade Marks Act and 
can simultaneously enjoy protection as a well-known 
foreign mark and as a common law mark.
Registration of a mark under the Trade Marks Act 
in respect of particular goods or services grants the 
proprietor exclusive rights to the use of that trade mark 
(or a confusingly similar mark) in relation to those or 
similar goods and services for as long as it remains valid 
and is on the register. It can remain registered indefinitely, 
subject to its being procedurally renewed every 10 years.
For a trade mark to enjoy the status of being a well-known 
foreign mark, as provided for in section 35 of the Trade 
Marks Act, it must emanate from a foreign country that is 
a member of the Convention of Paris for the Protection 
of Industrial Property, 1883 (Paris Convention), and it 
must have been used to a significant extent internationally 
and/or in South Africa so as to render it well known in 
South Africa to a substantial body of people as being the 
badge of origin of a foreign trader.43  
A mark, whether registered or not, that has been used to 
such an extent that it has acquired a repute as designating 
the goods and/or services of a particular trader enjoys 
protection under the common law of passing off. While 
the rights subsisting in such a common law mark are 
part of the goodwill of the business in which it has 
been used and are theoretically inseparable from such 
goodwill, a mark of this nature in practice effectively has 
an independent existence.44 
6.2 Significance of use of a trade mark
Use of a trade mark in relation to particular goods or 
services is the lifeblood of that trade mark. In the case of a 
registered trade mark, in order to qualify as the applicant 
for registration, a trader must use or propose to use 
that mark in relation to particular goods or services.45 If a 
trade mark is not inherently capable of distinguishing the 
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proprietor’s goods and therefore is in principle ineligible 
for registration, it can acquire distinctiveness and become 
registerable as a result of extensive use.46  
A trade mark once registered can be removed from the 
register on the grounds of non-use in two circumstances: 
first, if the trade mark was registered without any bona 
fide intention on the part of the applicant to use it and 
there has in fact been no use of the mark subsequent to 
the application date; and second, if a period of five years 
has elapsed during which there has been no use of it by 
or on behalf of the registered proprietor in relation to 
the goods or services for which it is registered. Indeed, a 
registered trade mark that is not used is an anathema to 
the Trade Marks Act.
If a registered trade mark has not been used for a five-
year period and is therefore liable to cancellation, the 
court may in terms of section 27(1)(b) of the Trade Marks 
Act excuse such non-use if it has been due to special 
circumstances in the trade and not to any intention on 
the part of its proprietor to abandon it. This is a specific 
exception to the general rule regarding loss of a trade 
mark through non-use, and it does not detract from the 
general principle that a registered trade mark must be 
used or otherwise it is forfeited.
Both in the case of a well-known foreign trade mark 
and a common law trade mark, the rights in that trade 
mark and their continued existence are dependent on 
significant use of that mark taking place in relation to 
particular goods or services. Without such use, the right 
of property and the trade mark itself cannot continue 
to exist. The trade mark is extinguished when the use 
thereof is not perpetuated. The rights in a mark of this 
nature are dependent upon the existence of a reputation 
in that mark amongst the public, and such a repute will 
wither away and die without use of the mark. Non-use 
results in the mark being extinguished.
To sum up, the rights subsisting in a trade mark, whether 
a registered trade mark, a well-known foreign trade mark 
or a common law trade mark, will in time dissipate if use 
of it ceases. The trade mark will become defunct and 
will lose its ability to function as a badge of origin, its 
very raison d’être, and all rights in the trade mark will be 
extinguished. 
6.3 Value of trade marks 
Trade marks have a commercial dimension in addition 
to a legal dimension. They are commercial assets of 
considerable value. A trade mark is the core of what is 
referred to in commerce as a ‘brand’. A brand is comprised 
of both the trade mark itself and its commercial impact. 
Legal protection of trade marks is essential if brands are 
to serve their purpose and fulfil their economic function.47 
The concept of a ‘brand’ encompasses the mark, name, 
logo, image and perceptions that identify a product in 
the minds of customers and distinguish it from similar 
products. It is the practical manifestation of the badge of 
origin function of a trade mark. It takes shape in advertising, 
packaging and other marketing communications featuring 
a trade mark and becomes the focus of the product’s 
relationship with customers. In time, a brand comes to 
embody a promise about the goods it identifies and 
can influence customers’ choices amongst competing 
products. 
When consumers trust a brand and find it relevant, they 
may select the offering associated with that brand over 
the offerings of competitors.48 A brand is an extremely 
valuable asset in a business.
The commercial value of a brand is known as ‘brand 
equity’. It is a term used in the marketing industry to 
denote the value of having a well-known brand, based on 
the notion that a well-known brand applied to a product 
can generate more revenue than a lesser known brand. 
It is accepted that consumers believe that a product with 
a well-known brand is better than a product with an 
unfamiliar brand. Brand equity is in effect synonymous with 
and is the equivalent marketing term for the reputation of 
a trade mark, which is the prerequisite for the existence 
of a well-known foreign mark and a common law mark. 
There are widely accepted methodologies for calculating 
the monetary value of trade marks or brands, in other 
words, the brand equity. The valuation of trade marks 
is necessary for many business transactions such as 
mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcy, the sale of trade marks 
and the calculation of royalty rates for licensing. There are 
three primary trade mark valuation methodologies: the 
revenue approach, which utilises either the discounted 
cash flow or the capitalisation of earnings to estimate the 
net present value of the trade mark’s anticipated future 
cash flows and profits; the market approach, which 
compares the pricing of similar trade marks; and the cost 
approach, which examines the investment required to 
replace the trade mark or to essentially recreate it.49  
Forbes magazine commissioned Brand Finance, a brand 
valuation consultancy in the United States of America, 
to compile a list of the 10 most valuable trade marks 
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worldwide in 2011. Brand Finance used the first of the 
methodologies discussed above in making its valuation 
and concluded that the world’s most valuable trade mark 
was GOOGLE, with a value of $44.3 billion. The Google 
company has a market capitalisation of $164 billion. 
The trade mark GOOGLE thus represents 27% of the 
company’s overall value.50
6.4 Effect of non-use of trade marks
Brand equity, this extremely valuable commercial asset, 
is the commercial dimension of all three forms of trade 
mark (i.e. registered trade marks, well-known foreign 
marks and common law marks) and is derived essentially 
from the manner and the extent of the use of the relevant 
trade mark. The use of a trade mark thus has enormous 
financial and commercial implications and consequences. 
Brand equity will dissipate and be extinguished if the use 
of the trade mark in question ceases. This will lead to 
the destruction of probably the major asset of the trade 
mark proprietor. As David Haigh, the founder of Brand 
Finance, puts it, “[T]he single largest source of intangible 
value in a company is its trade mark.”51 
7. SOUTH AFRICAN PLAIN   
 PACKAGING LEGISLATION
As discussed above, the South African Minister of 
Health has stated that South Africa will follow Australia’s 
example by banning the display of brand names on 
tobacco products save in certain restricted manners. 
This was confirmed by Vilma Moodley, the Director 
for Health Promotion at the Department of Health. 
The Director advised members of Parliament’s Health 
Portfolio Committee that South Africa is aiming to follow 
Australia’s lead and compel tobacco companies to use 
plain packaging for their tobacco products.52  
To date no draft legislation dealing with plain packaging 
for tobacco products has appeared. It is, no doubt, safe 
to assume, and this assumption will be made for the 
purposes of this study, that in due course the South 
African Government will publish legislation that clones 
the Australian Tobacco Plain Packaging Act, 2011, and will 
introduce the same restrictions on branding of tobacco 
products. This means that the postulated legislation will 
allow a very small part of the surface area of cigarette 
packs for the display of a trade mark, the mark will be 
required to be depicted in plain block capitals of a small 
size and such depiction will have to be against a drab 
background. No use of logos and other pictorial signs 
commonly used and registered as trade marks will be 
permitted, and thus all use of tobacco marks of this 
nature will cease. 
In order to analyse the effect of such legislation on a typical 
tobacco trade mark used and registered in South Africa, 
the trade mark DUNHILL will be taken as an example. 
The word mark DUNHILL is registered in the name of 
Dunhill Tobacco of London Limited, a British company 
based in the United Kingdom, under number 43/910/1 
in Class 34 of the trade marks classification in respect of 
“cigarettes, tobacco and tobacco products”. In addition, 
Dunhill of London Limited has a large number of pictorial 
registered trade marks in South Africa consisting of or 
incorporating the word ‘DUNHILL’. Two of these trade 
marks will be selected for the purposes of this study. 
They are trade marks numbers 95/12749 DUNHILL logo 
and 94/6892 DUNHILL label, both registered in Class 34 
in respect of “cigarettes, tobacco and tobacco products”. 
The marks that are the subjects of these registrations are 
depicted below. Trade marks numbers 95/12749 and 
94/6892 will hereinafter be referred to collectively as the 
‘DUNHILL Device marks’.
           94/6892                       95/12749
8. NON-USE OF THE DUNHILL   
 DEVICE MARKS 
The trade marks DUNHILL and the DUNHILL Device 
marks have been used extensively throughout the world, 
including in South Africa. As a result of such use (i.e. by 
depiction of the marks on packs of the products as sold and 
in advertising and promotion), the marks have acquired 
a substantial repute. Such marks are known to the public 
as signs designating cigarettes emanating from a particular 
manufacturer (Dunhill Tobacco of London). By virtue 
of this circumstance, the marks, and more especially the 
DUNHILL Device marks, qualify as well-known foreign 
marks for the purposes of section 35 of the Trade Marks 
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Act, and they are the subject of strong common law 
rights in South Africa, thus constituting them as common 
law marks in South Africa. The DUNHILL Device marks 
are protected in all three of the guises discussed above. 
Each guise simultaneously constitutes a separate entity, 
namely a registered trade mark, a well-known foreign 
trade mark and a common law mark. There is substantial 
brand equity in the cumulative DUNHILL Device marks. 
The DUNHILL Device marks will be prohibited from 
use by Dunhill Tobacco of London Limited in relation to 
the goods for which they are registered and in respect 
of which they enjoy a repute in terms of the postulated 
South African plain packaging legislation. Their use will 
thus become unlawful in South Africa and therefore will 
be terminated. They will be doomed to extinction. 
The word ‘DUNHILL’ is a surname. Surnames are not 
considered to be inherently distinctive marks; nor are 
the pictorial elements of the DUNHILL Device marks. 
In order that they might be registerable, it must be 
shown that they have acquired distinctiveness through 
extensive use.  The marks therefore rely to a large extent 
for their distinctiveness (the essential qualification for the 
registration and the existence of a trade mark) on the 
extent of their usage. The cessation of their use will cause 
their distinctiveness to decline, and they could in time 
become disqualified from registration on this account. In 
terms of section 24(1) of the Trade Marks Act, a trade 
mark that is an entry wrongly remaining on the register 
can be cancelled at the instance of the third party. The 
DUNHILL Device marks will become entries wrongly 
remaining on the register in the form in which they are 
registered. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, a 
registered trade mark can be cancelled at the instance 
of the third party on the grounds of non-use of it by its 
proprietor in certain circumstances. The outcome of the 
cessation of the use of DUNHILL Device registered trade 
marks will be that the registrations may be cancelled and 
that the marks will be extinguished.
The effect of non-use of a trade mark is more serious 
in the case of a well-known foreign mark. A well-known 
foreign mark relies for its protection in South Africa 
entirely on its recognition by the South African public 
as being a mark designating origin in a particular foreign 
producer. Such recognition is directly related to the 
extent of use of the mark. If use of the mark terminates, 
the reputation enjoyed by it will peter out and the mark 
will be extinguished. A common law mark is in the same 
position, and the discontinuation of its use will inevitably 
cause that mark to be extinguished. The DUNHILL 
Device marks in their guises of well-known foreign marks 
and common law marks will be extinguished once their 
use terminates. The brand equity in these marks will be 
destroyed. 
9. TRADE MARKS AS PROPERTY
There can be no doubt that trade marks, being assets of 
a business, are property for the purposes of private law. 
Trade marks are a species of the class of rights known 
as intellectual property, which includes patents, copyright 
and designs. The Copyright Act specifically provides in 
section 22(1) that copyright constitutes property, and 
this proposition has been confirmed by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in the case of Gallo Africa Limited v Sting 
Music (Pty) Limited.54 It was stated that all intellectual 
property rights, including trade marks, were immovable 
incorporeal property. 
Preventing the use of a trade mark and thereby causing 
it to be extinguished thus has a far-reaching effect. 
Extinguishing a trade mark amounts to the destruction 
of an item of property. Even curtailing or limiting the use 
of a trade mark detracts from the enjoyment of the full 
rights of property and is thus a diminution of the rights 
of property. 
Prohibiting the use of the DUNHILL Device marks can 
lead to the cancellation of registered trade marks numbers 
95/12749 and 94/6892 and will destroy and extinguish 
these marks in their guises as well-known foreign marks 
and common law trade marks. The brand equity in them 
will become defunct.
10. DEPRIVATION OF THE DUNHILL  
 DEVICE MARKS
The question of whether the impairment and extinguishing 
of the DUNHILL Device marks as described above, as a 
result of the state’s prohibiting their use in relation to 
tobacco products, infringes the provisions of sections 
25(1) and/or (2) of the South African Constitution must 
now be addressed. 
In the event that such impairment and extinguishing 
amounts to the arbitrary deprivation and/or expropriation 
of property as contemplated in sections 25(1) and/or (2) 
of the Constitution, such an action would infringe those 
provisions. The question of whether the postulated 
plain packaging legislation will constitute a law of general 
application as contemplated in section 25 is also relevant.
For the purposes of this discussion, it is accepted that 
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the postulated plain packaging legislation will be a law 
of general application. The issue is perhaps not beyond 
doubt because the legislation will not affect all trade mark 
proprietors but will affect only those who own and use 
trade marks in respect of cigarettes, tobacco and tobacco 
products, but this point will not be pursued. The effect of 
this admission is that for the purposes of this discussion, 
the postulated plain packaging legislation will in principle 
constitute a law capable of legitimately depriving owners 
of property or expropriating property.
10.1 Are trade marks property for    
 constitutional purposes?
It is necessary to determine whether the DUNHILL 
Device marks constitute ‘property’ within the meaning of 
this term used in section 25 of the Constitution. If they 
do not constitute property, that will be the end of the 
matter and there can be no question that the impairment 
or the extinguishing of the marks infringes section 25 of 
the Constitution.
The Constitutional Court in In re: Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 199655  held that 
the right to hold intellectual property as a fundamental 
right did not require to be specifically addressed in the 
Constitution and implied that this was unnecessary 
as intellectual property was protected in terms of the 
property clause. The Association of Marketers had 
sought such specific protection for intellectual property. 
In presenting its case, the Association of Marketers had 
propounded that there should be a section in the Bill of 
Rights reading as follows: 
“Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and 
material interest resulting from any industrial, scientific, 
literary or artistic production of which they are creators, or 
brand equity of which they are the proprietors.”56  
In holding that such a provision was unnecessary by virtue 
of the existence of the property clause, the Constitutional 
Court impliedly accepted that these “material interests” 
and “brand equity” were forms of property falling within 
the ambit of section 25.
In Laugh It Off Promotions CC v The South African Breweries 
International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International 
(Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae),57 the 
Constitutional Court held that the right of freedom 
of expression (enshrined in section 16(1) of the 
Constitution) and intellectual property rights (more 
specifically trade marks) enjoyed equal status under the 
Constitution. The authorities generally accept this as 
recognition or an endorsement of the proposition that 
intellectual property falls within the concept of ‘property’ 
dealt with in section 25 of the Constitution.58  In support 
of this proposition, it must be pointed out that the case in 
the Constitutional Court was an appeal from a decision 
of the Supreme Court of Appeal59 and that that court 
held that: 
“Trade marks are property, albeit intangible or incorporeal. 
The fact that property is intangible does not make it of a 
lower order. Our law has always recognised incorporeals 
as a class of things in spite of theoretical objections 
thereto  […]”60 
The Constitutional Court did not challenge this dictum 
and must be taken to have approved it. It can thus now be 
accepted as trite that trade marks and other intellectual 
property rights constitute property for the purposes of 
section 25 of the Constitution.
In the Australian JT International SA case,61 the court 
accepted that intellectual property constituted property 
for the purposes of the Australian constitutional 
provision.62 It is interesting to note that in paragraphs 206 
and 207 of the judgment, Haydon included common 
law rights in marks and get-up as falling within the 
concept of ‘property’ and expressed the view that the 
Australian constitutional provision protected property 
in its broadest sense. It is submitted that this supports 
the contention that brand equity, as discussed above, 
falls within the ambit of the intellectual property that 
section 25 of the South African Constitution protects. It 
is certainly considered to be a component of intellectual 
property rights in intellectual property law. 
To sum up, intellectual property, including brand equity, 
falls within the ambit of property as contemplated 
in section 25 of the South African Constitution. The 
DUNHILL Device marks, in all three trade mark guises, 
are thus property falling within the ambit of section 25.
10.2 Deprivation of property
In the event that the trade mark proprietor is prevented 
from using the DUNHILL Device marks, which will 
lead to their being extinguished, the question arises 
whether this amounts to a deprivation of property, as 
contemplated in section 25(1) of the Constitution. As 
stated above, deprivation involves an interference with 
the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property. It 
can relate to some, but not necessarily all, of the incidents 
of ownership of property. Restricting the use of a trade 
mark, let alone the complete extinguishing of an item of 
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property, clearly falls within the scope of deprivation in 
this context. 
In the Australian JT International SA case, French held 
that the prevention of the use of trade marks brought 
about by the plain packaging legislation was a ‘taking’ of 
property. He said that the rights in respect of registered 
trade marks;
“[A]re in substance, if not form, denuded of their value and 
thus of their utility by the imposition of the regime under the 
Packaging Act […] [T]he result is that while the trade marks 
remain on the face of the register, their value and utility for 
assignment and licensing is very substantially impaired.”63  
It is submitted that the ‘taking’ referred to by the learned 
judge is the equivalent of deprivation in section 25(1) 
of the South African Constitution. If interfering with the 
use of a trade mark amounts to taking or deprivation of 
that trade mark, it follows that the complete obliteration 
or extinguishing of a trade mark, as will occur when the 
DUNHILL Device marks in the guise of, respectively, 
famous foreign and common law marks are prohibited 
from use, must all the more amount to deprivation of 
that mark and to the destruction of the brand equity in it. 
In the premises, the prohibition of the use of the 
DUNHILL Device marks amounts to deprivation of 
property for the purposes of section 25(1).
10.3 Deprivation that is arbitrary
Deprivation must be arbitrary before it can constitute 
an infringement of section 25(1) of the South African 
Constitution. Deprivation of property is arbitrary when 
the law that effects it does not provide sufficient reason 
for the particular deprivation. The provision effecting 
the deprivation should manifest a rational connection 
between a legitimate government purpose and the 
deprivation of property, and it should show adequate 
cause for the deprivation. In effect, this means that the 
deprivation must be justified by the effect that is sought to 
be achieved. There must be a causal connection between 
the deprivation and the objective that the provision seeks 
to achieve. 
A trade mark is a badge of origin. It is a means of 
distinguishing the goods of person A from the same 
or similar goods emanating from person B. This is the 
purpose, objective and function of the DUNHILL Device 
marks. The end that the government will seek to achieve 
by means of plain packaging legislation is to discourage 
the use of tobacco products and to diminish the 
prevalence of cigarette smoking. It defies comprehension 
how destroying an item of property that serves as a 
badge of origin for goods can be brought into relation 
with discouraging smoking. A trade mark is an instrument 
for creating clarity in regulating the consumer’s ability to 
choose between competing products. It is a non sequitur 
to suggest that if the ability of the consumer to distinguish 
between the products of producer A and producer B 
is diminished or is taken away, it will have the effect of 
discouraging or inhibiting the smoking of cigarettes. The 
question can be posed; How will impairing the ability of 
consumers to properly distinguish between, for instance, 
DUNHILL and MARLBORO cigarettes bring about a 
reduction in the smoking of cigarettes? The answer is 
self-evident. It is also absurd to suggest that because the 
trade mark DUNHILL is pictorially represented in the 
DUNHILL Device marks, the public will be enticed to 
take up smoking, increase its consumption of cigarettes 
or be dissuaded from giving up smoking. There is simply 
no connection whatsoever between the objective of the 
postulated plain packaging legislation and the pictorial 
representations of the DUNHILL Device marks.
Even if it is argued that the DUNHILL Device marks have 
an advertising or promotional function in addition to 
their badge of origin function, what is being advertised or 
promoted by the use of the marks is not the desirability of 
smoking but the preference for DUNHILL cigarettes over, 
for instance, MARLBORO cigarettes. The appearance of 
the DUNHILL logo is simply incapable of extolling the 
desirability of or encouraging the smoking habit; nor is it 
intended to have that effect.
It is clear that the notion that the prohibition of the use 
of trade marks (especially pictorial trade marks) can 
diminish the use of tobacco products is an incorrect 
or faulty premise. This faulty premise lies at the root of 
the misguided international campaign against the use of 
tobacco trade marks.
In consequence, and in the premises, the deprivation of 
property brought about by the prevention of the use of 
the DUNHILL Device marks is arbitrary, as contemplated 
in section 25(1) of the Constitution.
10.4 Expropriation of the DUNHILL device  
 marks 
It is submitted that the contemplated deprivation of 
property in the case of the DUNHILL Device marks 
constitutes an expropriation of those marks, as 
envisaged in section 25(2) of the Constitution. 
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The question of whether ‘expropriation’ necessarily 
means that the ownership of the property that is 
taken away must pass to the state has been discussed 
above. There are good grounds for the proposition that 
expropriation in the constitutional context does not 
necessarily require the passing of ownership to the state, 
especially when the property in question is a trade mark. 
This principle in particular resonates in the doctrine of 
‘constructive expropriation’, in terms of which an action 
that has the effect of removing and destroying all the 
rights of a particular property holder can be regarded 
as expropriation. The court has left open the question 
of whether the doctrine of constructive expropriation is 
recognised in South Africa.
In order to fulfil its function and to be valid, a trade 
mark must be used as a badge of origin in the course of 
trade, meaning that it must be used by the proprietor in 
the course of conducting commercial activities. Against 
this background, it is difficult to envisage how the state 
could ever validly acquire proprietorship of a trade mark 
in respect of tobacco products. The state, per se, does 
not conduct trade in tobacco products. A tobacco mark 
would cease to qualify as a trade mark in the hands of 
the state. It is difficult to contemplate, therefore, how 
expropriation of a tobacco trade mark could possibly 
entail the state necessarily acquiring the ownership of 
that trade mark. Expropriation in the context of trade 
marks, and in particular tobacco trade marks, must mean 
something that does not entail the state’s becoming the 
owner of the property, otherwise section 25(2) would 
be nonsensical when applied to trade marks. 
The extinguishing of tobacco trade marks by the state is 
a situation that is eminently suited to the adoption and 
application of the doctrine of constructive expropriation 
in South African law. By prohibiting the use of the 
DUNHILL device marks, the state extinguishes those 
trade marks and renders them nugatory. This amounts to 
expropriation, both in the literal and constructive senses.
As previously mentioned, the impression is gained that 
section 25 was in reality drafted with land in mind and that 
its application to other forms of property was something 
of an afterthought. It is submitted that this factor requires it 
to be interpreted somewhat liberally and figuratively when 
dealing with other forms of property besides land. This is 
particularly true for intellectual property for which it is, with 
respect, ill suited. This approach militates in favour of the 
recognition of the doctrine of constructive expropriation, 
particularly when dealing with intellectual property. 
The conduct of the state in taking away the right of the 
trade mark proprietor to use the DUNHILL Device 
marks constitutes a deprivation of those trade marks 
that leads to their extinction and therefore amounts to 
expropriation of those marks, as contemplated in section 
25(2) of the Constitution.
10.5 The public interest 
For an expropriation of property to avoid infringing 
section 25(2) of the Constitution, it is required that it is in 
the public interest that it should take place. The authorities 
say that a deprivation of property that is arbitrary cannot 
be in the public interest. For the reasons advanced above 
in contending that the deprivation of the DUNHILL 
Device marks would be arbitrary, a deprivation of those 
marks that constitutes an expropriation will ipso facto 
not be in the public interest. It should therefore not be 
allowed. If it is deemed to be in the public interest or for 
a public purpose, it must be made subject to the payment 
of compensation, as contemplated in section 25(2)(b), 
read together with section 3, of the Constitution.
11. CONCLUSION
The prohibition of the use of the DUNHILL Device marks 
by means of the postulated plain packaging legislation will 
infringe section 25 of the Constitution. It will amount 
to an arbitrary deprivation of those trade marks, as a 
form of property, and it is thus prohibited outright by 
section 25(1) of the Constitution. When categorised 
as an ‘expropriation’ of property, the prohibition of the 
use of the DUNHILL Device marks could be argued 
to be in the public interest (which is denied), and 
provided that appropriate compensation is paid to the 
trade mark proprietor, it would be permissible. In these 
circumstances, the legislation will not infringe section 25 
of the Constitution. The factors that must be taken into 
account when determining adequate compensation are 
set out in section 25(3) of the Constitution. One such 
factor, and probably the dominant one in the case of trade 
marks, is the market value of the property. As explained, 
there are recognised methodologies for determining the 
market value of trade marks and in general they depend 
upon the revenue flow generated by the trade marks. In 
the case of the DUNHILL Device marks, it is anticipated 
that such value would be considerable and would 
probably amount to a substantial sum of money.
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While this study has been concerned with the deprivation 
of tobacco trade marks, it will apply equally to the 
deprivation of the use of trade marks in other fields, 
for instance trade marks in respect of liquor products. 
There have been suggestions, both internationally and in 
South Africa, that similar steps to those restricting the 
use of tobacco trade marks should be taken in the case 
of liquor trade marks. It is possible that the practice of 
governments seeking to achieve social ends through 
the prohibition of the use of trade marks could become 
widespread and could be extended to foodstuffs and all 
sorts of goods. 
Governments’ pursuance of aims such as reducing the 
consumption of tobacco products and liquor products 
is laudable. It is submitted, however, that attempting to 
achieve these aims by targeting the use of trade marks 
or other intellectual property is both ineffective and 
improper. Intellectual property ought not to be misused 
for purposes that bear little or no relation to the milieu 
in which it operates. 
I return to the question of whether the Australian JT 
International case is a precedent that should necessarily 
be followed in other countries and more especially in 
South Africa. This question must be answered in the 
negative, both for South Africa and other countries. For 
the Australian constitutional provision to be infringed, it 
was necessary to show that prohibiting the use of tobacco 
marks constituted an acquisition of the ownership of 
those marks by the state. 
As has been explained above, the test for constitutional 
regularity is significantly different in South Africa. In South 
Africa the focus is on the arbitrary deprivation of 
trade marks as items of property. In a secondary context, 
the point at issue is whether the deprivation constitutes 
expropriation of those trade marks by the state, 
with this term not necessarily being comparable to the 
acquisition of ownership of the trade marks by the state 
as required in Australia. The Australian decision turns on 
the very specific provisions of that country’s constitution, 
and due cognisance should be taken of this factor by the 
courts of other countries. 
The Minister of Health’s assumption, referred to above, 
that what is good for Australia would automatically be 
good for South Africa is thus unfounded and incorrect. 
Accordingly, the battle in the global war against tobacco 
products won in Australia is but a localised one and has 
a limited effect on the war against the use of tobacco 
products being fought elsewhere and in particular in South 
Africa. In the event that this issue should come before 
the South African court, it should be examined afresh and 
through the prism of the South African Constitution.
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